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ABSTRACT

A Downward Spiral; Young People, the Media,
and Political Disengagement
by
Jacqueline M. Maloy
Dr. Lawrence Mullen, Examination Committee Chair
Associate Professor of Communication
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
This study examines whether political disengagement is related to the amount
and/or type of television that young people watch. The study was conducted through
survey research at University of Nevada, Las Vegas, with over one hundred
undergraduate participants. It demonstrates that there is no relationship between the
amount of television which students watch and their political engagement. However, it
also demonstrates that there is a relationship between the types of television programs
which students watch and their attitudes toward politics and politicians. Frequent
viewers of local news feel less trusting toward the government in Washington, whereas
frequent viewers of late-night talk shows feel greater trust toward politics and politicians.
Further, there is a relationship between the types of programs which students watch and
their level of political involvemenL Frequent viewers of local news, network news, and
political talk shows are more involved with politics than less frequent viewers.

itt
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CHAPTER!

INTRODUCTION
In the United States, young people between the ages of 18 to 24 have the lowest
voting participation rate of any age group in the voting-age population (Hall & Jones,
1998).

Have young adults simply become more alienated from the political process than

their elders? Is this an understandable reaction to growing up in an era of major political
scandals, including Watergate, the Iran-Contra affair, and Whitewater? This chapter will
examine several theories as to why young adults seem disengaged from the electoral
process, including the effects of the mass media. The following chapters will describe a
survey research project through which young people’s political attitudes will be
measured. In this survey project, an adaptation of Gerbneifs cultivation theory will be
used to look at relationships between indicators of political disengagement and mass
media use, specifically television viewing. This study suggests that political attitudes and
activity are tied to media use, which creates a downward spiral of interest in politics for
the younger generation. Thus, as young people rely more on television for political cues,
they become more and more disenchanted with politicians, campaigns, and government
in general.
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Describing cultivation theory, Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, and Signorielli (1982)
write that “the assumptions, beliefs, and values of heavy viewers differ systematically
from those of light viewers in the same demographic groups” (p. 104). This study will
explore the possibility that college-aged heavy television viewers feel more negatively
toward government than their counterparts who are light viewers. When studying
perceptions of violence, Gerbner (1972) found that heavy viewers believe that much
more violence exists in the world than do light viewers. According to Jeffres (1997),
Gerbner “concluded that television viewing cultivated this distorted view of a ‘mean and
scary world’” (p. 87). Instead of violence, this study focuses on perceptions of
government, politics, and politicians, and hypothesizes that heavy viewers who are young
adults cultivate the view of a negative and untrustworthy government—the Government
Is Bad (and Boring) hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, if heavy viewers believe
that government is bad, they will also be less inclined to pay attention to elections, feel as
though they can make a difference (internal efBcacy), or become politically involved.
The hypothesis is based on the ideas that I) news coverage of politicians and campaigns
encourage a negative view of politics, 2) entertainment shows, such as late night talk
shows, tend to treat politicians derisively, and 3) young viewers find little political
information on television that is dfrected specifically toward them, either in content or
style.
Some of the hypotheses in this study will also be based on Putnam’s (1994,1995)
theory on the erosion of social capital. Accordmg to this theory, people spend more time
watching television and less tune involved m social and community interaction. This, he
argues, has caused a declme in civic and polMcal engagement
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My interest in this topic stems from teaching an introductory speech course to
students in this age group in 1999. Practically everyone in the class expressed a dislike
of politics. While the author’s “thirty-something” peers followed President Clinton’s
“intem-gate” troubles with avid interest, these students did not pay attention even to this
salacious scandal. Although some communication scholars might consider this a sensible
response to the overheated reporting of the Lewinsky story, students seem equally
uninterested in local issues, such as the conduct code at University of Las Vegas, water
conservation in the desert, and the governor’s plan to give college scholarships to high
school students who graduate with a B average or higher. The author’s concerns grew
when a colleague, a philosophy teacher, told about a class in which students insisted the
word “politician” was always a pejorative term or dysphemism.
It seems that these students may represent a national trend. Strama (1998) writes,
“Seven out of ten young people between the %es of 18 and 24 did not vote in the 1996
presidential elections. A 1997 UCLA survey of college freshmen nationwide finds their
interest in politics at a thirty-year low” (p. 71). This generation will soon lead the United
States. Should there be concern at their lack of civic participation and their seeming
disinterest in politics overall? If young people think that the very idea of being a
politician is suspect, what will that mean fr>r the future of American democracy?
In order to answer these questions, this chapter will review several quantitative
studies and qualitative papers that focus on youth and political disengagement. Some of
these studies deal specifically with members of “Generation X.” This generational label
became popular because of Douglas Coupland’s novel of the same name, written in 1991,
and usually applies to those bom between 1961 and 1981. Other researchers compare the
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political attitudes of Generation X to the generation that came directly before them—the
Baby Boomers. Writers generally use the term Baby Boomers to describe those people
bom in the 15 to 20 years after World War U. Still other research looks at the
characteristics of today’s youngest possible voters, the Millennials, bom from 1982
through 2005.
First, the chapter will cover whether or not young adults have always exhibited
less interest in politics than older adults. Next, it will show how the American public on
the whole feels more disengaged from politics, and will note theories as to why the
cynicism exists. Then, the paper will focus on characteristics of Generation X and
Millennials, including several scholars’ theories as to why these young people exhibit
even less interest in politics than the rest of Americans. In the next section, the chapter
will review studies on how marketing forces and the media target political messages to
young Americans, and how young Americans respond to these messages. In the final
section, the chapter will focus on media effects, and how media effects and political
attitudes will be analyzed in the next four chapters.

Political Participation of Young Adults Over Time
Have young Americans always been much more disengaged from politics than
their elders? If we answer “yes,” then we should not feel any particular alarm now.
Indeed, while older adults may worry about why college-age students do not vote,
college-age students were only given the opportunity in recent decades. It wasn’t until
1972 that the federal law lowered the voting age people from 21 to 18—the age at which
American men could be drafted (Bennett & Craig, 1997).
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In the introduction to After the Boom: The Politics of Generation K Bennett and
Craig (1997) describe some of the challenges for those who study generations. For
example, when looking at political participation of youth over time, researchers must
consider “aging or life cycle ” effects (Bennett & Craig, 1997). Life cycle effects account
for the fact that people face similar stmggles at similar points in life. For example,
young people might always tend to show less interest in politics because at that point in
their lives, they spend their time establishing a career and finding a mate. Bennett and
Craig (1997) go on to explain why researchers need to consider life cycle effects when
looking at generational demographic data:
Although. . . long-term research focus is rare . . . those who study political
generations must nonetheless consider the possibility that whatever age-based
differences they observe in their (usually) cross-sectional data are due to life
cycle factors rather than generational change. If, for example, we look at a public
opinion survey in 1996 and learn that young adults are less likely to identify with
a political party than are older citizens, should we assume that this is because the
former constitute a less partisan generation, that is, they have been shaped by
events in such a way that they will probably remain less supportive of parties for
the rest of their lives? Or is it because the political identities of young people
have not yet fully developed, and thus they tend in any historical era to be less
partisan than then: elders (p, 7)?
Bennett and Craig (1997) suggest that researchers can best study life-cycle e&cts by
ft>Uowing a group of individuals throughout their lives, measuring attitudes and behaviors
at regular intervals. The researchers would need to compare the patterns of the group
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studied to the patterns found in the population overall. This is difficult but necessary
work.
In his study of political apathy, Bennett (1986) developed a “Political Apathy
Index,” by using surveys to measure both campaign interest and attention to public
affairs. Bennett, using data collected from I960 to 1984, found that:
young Americans have consistently paid less attention to public affairs than either
the middle-aged or (in most cases) the elderly, despite having the advantage of
more years of formal schooling (a factor that is strongly and inversely related to
apathy), (p. 26)
Bennett and Rademacher’s (1997) statistical study of the forces responsible for
political apathy compared the political involvement of Early Boomers, Late Boomers,
and Gen-Xers when each group was between 18 and 26 years old. These authors define
Early Boomers as those bom between 1946 and 1954, Late Boomers as those bom
between 1955 and 1964, and Gen-Xers as those bom between 1965 and 1978. These
researchers performed regression analyses on 1972 data for Early Boomers, 1980 data for
Late Boomers, and 1992 data for Gen-Xers. The authors used “race, gender, marital
status, education, occupation, income, strength of partisan identification, and concem
about which party would win the election” as variables (p. 28). Fust, the researchers
found that education serves as the factor most strongly correlated to interest in politics.
Second, they found real differences between the generations. For example, gender
usually correlates with political interest, but it was not a factor in 1972, when the
Women’s Movement was at its height. Third, for Gen.-Xers, ident^dng with other young
people predicted a lack of interest in politics. This last pomt is particularly intriguing
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since, as Bennett and Rademacher (1997) note, any group identification usually predicts a
greater interest in politics.

Mass Cynicism and American Politics Today
Many writers who cover politics and communication argue that the American
population on the whole shows more cynicism about the political process than previous
generations (Dionne, 1991; Hart, 1999). In their book. The Spiral of Cynicism. Cappella
and Jamieson (1997) note findings of the National Opinion Research Center Survey,
which show that in 1970, 75 percent of respondents said that they felt either a great deal
or a fair amount of confidence in the government as a problem solver. By 1993, only 42
percent gave the same answer to this survey question. Why? Some researchers seek to
explain this general alienation as an effect of political news coverage. Bennett (1997), for
example, writes about her content analysis of print and broadcast “ad watches” during the
1996 presidential elections. In ad watches, news analysts review political advertisements
for false information. Bennett contends that the election coverage focuses on the
strategies that campaigners use, rather than on the issues campaigners address. The ad
watchers editorialize about dishonest politics, and the public concludes that politicians
are self-serving liars.
In Seducing America: How Television Charms the Modem Voter. Hart (1999)
argues that television, especially with shows such as PolMcallv Incorrect encourages
cynicism and the belief that “having an attitude” counts for more than having knowledge.
Hart also believes that television, with its focus on political personalities instead of
issues, encourages its audience to feel infatuated with candidates who speak well and
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show their emotions. The audience becomes terribly disillusioned when the candidates,
with whom they feel intimate, let them down in some way. The public then, according
to Hart, becomes cynical. Further, Hart suggests that because Americans watch
politicians and political analysts on television, they feel the illusion of taking part in the
political process without needing to vote.
Another explanation for the mass cynicism about the political process is that it
results from “culture wars” in political discourse that caused a kind of national identity
crisis. Belief in the political process seems to require a concem about groups beyond
one’s own. These culture wars, perhaps, made each group’s members feel less
sympathetic to members of other groups. Irving Kristol defined culture wars as
“profound division over what kind of country we are, what kind of people we are, and
what we mean by ‘The American Way of Life’” (Strauss & Howe, 1997, p. 203).
Individuals may now feel more concemed about their own groups, and less concemed
about the members of other groups because, as Strauss and Howe (1997) contend:
The Culture Wars had as many combatants as America had niches, from the
Nation of Islam to the Intemet. As each group exalted its own authenticity, it
defined its adversary’s values as indecent, stupid, obscene, or (a suddenly popular
word) evü. (p. 203)
In Todd Gitlin’s (1995) book on the culture wars, called The Twilight of
Common Dreams, the author asserts that the New Left of the 1960s and 1970s saw itself

as questioning and attacking the traditional values of American society. The New Left
defined these traditional values as the interests of straight wAite men. Even if their
dream s were not as radical as those mvolved believed, by separating themselves, the
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members of the New Left allowed the Right to claim the ideas of a “common America”
(p. 73).
On the other hand, in his address at the American Political Science Association,
Bennett (1998) argues that instability in the Job market caused a breakdown in the
traditional institutions in American society. As American companies let go of their
workers, these workers and their children grew more distrustful of institutions in general.
These American workers, Bennett believes, do not trust that traditional government will
provide solutions to these uncertain economic conditions.
In The Fourth Turning. Strauss and Howe (1997) examine cycles of history to
find generational shifts and patterns of social experience. These writers refer to the late
1990s as a time of “unraveling.” They say that the country is in a dark mood because the
end of the Cold War has produced a New World Order that feels unstable. Americans in
the 90s have seen the failure of health care reform, and have stopped believing that
institutions could solve their problems for them. The 0. J. Simpson trial and the Million
Man March showed a new kind of “racialism” in the culture (Strauss & Howe, 1997, p.
206). Certainly, this author would add the Clinton/Lewinslty scandal -including how the
government and the media handled the presidential crisis—to the issues that might make
Americans in general more likely to distrust institutions.
Like these other writers, Jonathan Cowan (1997) sees Americans in general as
losmg interest in the political system. In his essay on today’s youth, Cowan speaks as the
founder o f the youth movement “Lead or Leave,” an organization dedicated to solving
the United States’ deficit problenu Cowan states that “differences among generations
when measuring citizen disengagement and frustration with politics are realty in degree
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but not in kind. We’re ail fed up with politics as usual” (p. 196). Nonetheless, even if
any or all of these theories about American cynicism prove true, they fail to explain why
young people especially disengage themselves from the electoral process.

Specific Characteristics of Today’s Young Adults
What factors make today’s 18- to 24-year-olds particularly inclined toward
cynicism? Certainly, media scholars have written much about the special issues for those
in Generation X. Researchers generally define Generation X as being those bom between
1961 and 1981 (Strauss and Howe, 1991). This definition expands Gen X beyond “20somethings” to include those who are in their mid-thirties, and allows the use of the
wealth of demographic materials published about this Post Baby-Boom group. In their
book. Generations. Strauss and Howe (1991) use the label “Thirteeners” to describe this
thirteenth generation of Americans, and note the following:
Far more than other generations, 13ers feel that the real world is gearing
up to punish them down the road. Annual polls of high school seniors show that
those bom just after 1960 came of age much more fearful of national catastrophe
than those bom just before. These early 1960s babies... grew up as the kids
whose low test rates and high rates of crime, suicide, and substance abuse marked
a postwar extreme for American youth.

317)

Strauss and Howe (1991) explain this negative picture by describing the way
these 13ers were brought up. While those bom in the early 1960s had to compete with
the Baby Boomers, parents mainly left those bom in the 1970s on their own. Indeed,
during the 1970s, the number of “latchkey” children doubled. The 13ers are the children
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of broken families who grew up in a time of diminishing economic expectations. Their
parents were busy “self-actualizing” through their careers and personal lives, without
making the sacrifices for their children that their parents had made for them.
In her unpublished Masters’ thesis, Paula Gottula Miles (1997) reviews much of
the communication literature about Generation X. She notes that 40 percent of the
members of this generation grew up in a family where their parents divorced, compared
to just 11 percent of Boomers. Miles suggests that guilt-ridden mothers who went off to
work tried to make up for the lost time with their children by buying them toys. Media
gained a new importance for this generation—while the children were at home alone,
television became their constant companion. According to the 1995 Statistical Abstracts.
by the time an average child reaches the age of five, he or she has watched over 5000
hours of television, including 1000 hours of commercials targeting products to them
(Miles, 1997). The media and guilt-ridden parents, according to this theory, helped to
create a generation of materialistic young adults who want to have it all, and are bitter
when they don’t get it. In order to afford material goods, more members of this
generation continue to live with their parents beyond the age of 18.
Miles (1997) also contends that both because television content changed and
because parents were not home to guide television use, these young people, during
childhood, watched television with more adult themes than Baby Boomers before them.
Young adult books of the ‘70s, ‘80s, and ‘90s also dealt with fearful subject matter, such
as divorce, teen-age sex, and drug use, for the ffist time. These media-saturated children
largely had to figure out for themselves how best to make sense o f these scary issues,
which perhaps left them feeling cynical and distrustful toward older adults.
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Miles (1997) adds that members of Generation X do not commit to institutions or
people easily. In their lifetimes, they have seen that loyalty to a corporation does not
guarantee continued employment. Even with college education, members of this
generation have a harder time finding good jobs, with so many Baby Boomers ahead of
them. Also, after being brought up by career-occupied parents, Gen-Xers seem reluctant
to give work the same priority in their own lives. Finally, Miles notes that having
wimessed their parents’ divorces, many Gen-Xers wait longer to get married themselves
(Miles, 1997).
The Millennials, on the other hand, are being brought up by more carefully
nurturing Late Boomer parents. According to Strauss and Howe (1991), the first members
of this generation were bom in 1982. These generational scholars note that at around the
same time, a large number of books were published calling on parents to think carefully
about the effects on children of education with no instruction in values, latchkey
households, and divorce. These children also benefited from a new chUd-fiiendly trend in
Hollywood. The state governments, too, took a more protective stance toward this
generation, enacting safety measures such as the infant restraint laws for automobiles and
bicycle helmet laws. Quality education has become a greater political priority for parents
of these children than it was for the parents of Gen-Xers. However, these young people
still have had to deal with the effects of divorce and the fact that even if both parents stay
together, they most likely both have jobs (Strauss & Howe, 1991). In the election of
2000, the first of these Millennials will have the opportunity to vote. Whether or not they
will begin to reverse the trend toward apathy, given the fact that the government gave
them more attention and protection, will be a focus of future study.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

13

Political Participatioii and Today’s Young Adults
Are young people really so uniquely disengaged? Bennett (1998) states that
although young people find “lifestyle politics” more compelling than traditional
organized political group activity, they do actively engage with these more personal
political concerns. The young writer Michele Mitchell (1998) takes issue with the idea of
her generation’s apathy, writing A New Kind o f Party Animal to draw attention to her
peers’ involvement in social issues. Mitchell wrote the book partly as a response to the
media’s charges of apathy against her generation.
Strauss and Howe (1991) note that in a report, “Democracy’s Next Generation,”
by pollster Peter Hart, only 12 percent of “13ers” described voting as a characteristic of
good citizenship. However, 48 percent believed that generosity was an important
attribute of citizenship. Strauss and Howe describe 13ers attitudes this way:
When you vote, maybe you’ll waste your time—or, worse, later feel tricked. But
when you do something real, like bringing food to the homeless, you do
something that matters, if only on a small scale. The president of MIT has
likened the 13ers civic attitude to that of the Lone Ranger: Do a good deed, leave
a silver bullet, and move on. (p. 333)
On the other hand, the former acting head of Rock the Vote, Mark Strama (1998),
contends in an essay on youth participation that while young people in the 1990s
volunteer in record numbers, this volunteerism does not translate into belief in the power
of social movements for change. Strama writes ,“They seemed to view the political side
of these issues as maccessible and intractable, focusing instead on the satisfaction of
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serving an immediate need in then: community,” (1998, p. 72). Others, such as UNLV
Professor Ronald Wilbum, theorize more cynically that young people volunteer because
they have to in order to get into the better colleges (personal interviews, 1999).
As a founder of an advocacy group for young people, Jonathan Cowan (1997)
writes in his essay about young people and politics that traditional political caimot be
replaced. Cowan believes that though volunteerism can help build community, it cannot
substitute for political activity such as voting. Vermont Democratic Representative Matt
Dunne (1997) quotes the results of a student poll in his essay on youth and political
leadership. The poll findings show that while young people do want to make a difference
in the world, they simply believe that “meaningful social change cannot be achieved
through traditional American politics” (p. 253).
Other writers have looked at lack of party identification as an important piece of
the apathy puzzle. Dennis and Owen’s (1997) study examined data from the 1994
American National Election Study to measinre party identification and loyalty. These
researchers point out that members of Generation X do not identify with political parties
as strongly as previous generations did. This generation, according to Dennis and Owen,
get their political cues directly from television, and do not have (or take) the opportunity
to participate in political discussions with family members or peers. This leaves them
less entrenched in the political world, with fewer cues on how to vote. Their study
showed that Xers “are the cohort least likely to reject strongly the proposition that ‘we
probably don’t need political parties m America anymore’ and the one least inclined to
support continuation of the two-party tystem in its present form” (p. 59).
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Marketing Forces and the Media
With young people relying more and more on television for their political cues,
how is television responding to their need? The evidence suggests that 18 to 24 year olds
do not participate in the political process. Perhaps it is because mainstream political
culture has decided to ignore the young.
In his essay on public intellectuals, Giroux (1997) suggests that marketing
researchers “represent one of the few groups that appear attentive to how youth think,
feel, behave, and desnre” (p. 193). Giroux contends the entertainment media have
consistently portrayed these American youths in negative terms, especially young black
males. The media’s interests, Giroux believes, lie mainly in raising consumers, not active
citizens. Portrayed alternately as shallow hedonists or as “violent sociopaths” (p. 192),
Giroux suggests that media exploit youth, while public issues such as education and
health care disappear from public discourse, especially in media directed toward young
people. No wonder, then, that young people remain uninformed.
Miles (1997), however, asserts that because marketers do not understand this
generation’s attitudes and rhetoric, “politicians and advertisers cannot succeed in
appealing to or manipulating this vast and diverse group” (p. 5). She believes that young
people today grew particularly media savvy because of the amount of time they spent
watching television as children. They feel skeptical about advertising and marketmg
messages because they learned at an early age that they might well be disappointed in the
products advertised. In other words, they learned that advertisers misrepresent their
products.
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On the other hand, in an article discussing the uneasy “marriage” of popular
culture and politics, van Zoonen (1998) writes that popular political communication does
somewhat successfully direct some programming toward young people. Van Zoonen
gives the example of MTV and the “Rock the Vote” campaigiL This campaign made it
impossible for a traditional politician like George Bush to ignore the medium of the
young. While it did not “get out the vote” in impressive numbers, “Rock the Vote” did
help young people form opinions about the candidates, and in some cases, gave the
candidates the opportunity to forge a coimection with them (van Zoonen, 1998). Van
Zoonen concludes that popular culture and politics will grow ever closer.
Owen (1997) conducted a generational study using data gathered in 1992 and
1994 by the American National Election Surveys, as well as findings firom the 1996
Youth Voice Survey, which surveyed 1200 Americans between age 18 and 24. Owen
(1997) concludes that “most Xers do not identify with any current leader, not even Bill
Clinton, despite his efforts to reach out to them during his 1992 campaign” (p. 97). She
also finds a significant gap in the level of patriotism between younger and older
generations, despite efforts on the part of political parties to inspire such patriotism.
Finally, in then introduction to After the Boom, a book about politics and
Generation X, Bennett and Rademacher (1997) contend that because Gen Xers do not
use media to learn about public affoirs, th^r remain ignorant of political events. Further,
they write, “Thomas Jefferson once noted that there never has been, nor ever will be, a
people who are at once both politically ignorant and fiee” (p. 39).
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Media Effects and Directions for Research
According to my thesis, young people rely more heavily on the media for political
information and attitudes while at the same time they are less apt to be engaged in
discussion about politics with family and ftiends. A previous study (Maloy, 1999), found
a moderately strong correlation (r = .517, p < .001) between the amount of time spent
discussing politics with Mends and concern about who will win the next presidential
election. Similarly, a moderately strong correlation (r = .448, p. < .001) was found
between discussion of political issues with family and concern about who will win the
next presidential election. The students who have discussions are most concerned about
who will become president. However, many other students do not often take part in these
discussions. In this same study, 44% of those surveyed responded that they “rarely”
discuss political issues with Mends and family, and another 16% responded that they
discussed political issues less than “once or twice a month.”
With discussion less frequent, the media's hnpact may be growing. After
conducting four focus groups to determine voter response to campaign messages during
the 1996 presidential election, Kem (1997) found that political advertisements and news
coverage remforce the public's mistrust of politicians. McChesney (1999) argues that
media enforce the status quo because it is in their mterests for an uninterested majority to
let corporate powers govern.
According to MacManus (1996), one quarter of Americans between the ages of
18 to 29 watch late night TV talk shows regularly. One third of these viewers
acknowledge that they hear news about candidates and campaigns on these shows that
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they have not heard elsewhere. As the comedians on these shows make politicians seem
absurd, perhaps young Americans get reinforcement for their disinclination toward
political activity. Through survey research, this study will explore the connection
between young people’s television use and political apathy.
The second chapter will include reviews of literature covering theories of how
political socialization occurs and how political identifications are formed. The chapter
will then review literature that deals specifically with television media effects, focusing
particular attention on Putnam’s theory on the erosion of social capital and Gerbner’s
cultivation theory (1972). As Jeffires (1997) notes on cultivation, “This theory sees media
images molding society by the long-term presentation of relatively uniform versions of
social reality” (p. 86).
The literature review will include a recent study by Norris (1996) which shows
that heavy television viewing is associated with lower political participation rates. This
same study, according to Beimett (1998), shows that viewing television news and public
affairs is associated with higher rates of political participation, a finding that is especially
interesting given that young people are not the targeted demographic group for those
shows. The literature review wül also include a study conducted by Moy, Pfau, and
Kahlor (1999) which examines media use and public confidence in democratic
institutions, along with Pfku, Moy, Radier and Bridgeman’s (1998) study of how
individual communication media influence public confidence m democratic institutions.
The third chapter will outline the methodology for the survey study. This study
involves a convenience sample of over one hundred University of Nevada, Las Vegas
undergraduate students. The survey mcludes questions about the role of government in
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society, how involved and engaged students are (or plan to be) in the current political
campaign, attitudes toward government institutions, the news media, and politics in
general, and how much interest they have in politics. The survey also includes questions
about the number of hours students spend watching television. It is designed to test the
specific hypotheses about the effects of heavy use of television on (1) feelings of political
efficacy, (2) interest in politics, (3) political involvement, (4) assessments of politics and
politicians, and (5) trust in government institutions.
The predictor variables of the study are the average amounts of daily television
exposure, as well as the types of programs watched most fiequently. These wül be taken
from responses to survey questions.
The criterion variables are political self-identification, feelings about the role of
government in society, political involvement, feelings of internal efficacy, and attitudes
toward government, including confidence and trust levels. The survey takes less than 30
minutes for students to complete.
The fourth chapter wül analyze and discuss the results of the survey. Finally, the
fifth chapter wül propose directions for future research, based on the results of this study.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW
In order to establish the importance of television as a factor in forming political
attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors, this chapter will first review articles and books that
address theories of political socialization. The chapter will then cover literature that deals
with the relationship between television viewing and political engagement. Though two
different theories will be explored, both have in common the idea that those who are
heavy television viewers have a lower level of political engagement than lighter viewers.
The chapter will also set forth the five hypotheses and two research questions that this
study seeks to address.

Political Socialization
Political socialization, also sometimes referred to as politicization, is the means
by which people gain their political knowledge and ideas as well as the motivation to act
on this knowledge and these ideas. One might look at the factors that are generally
considered to be involved in political socialization to find out whether these have
changed for members of Generation X. This might help to explain their lack of
engagement with politics and government.
According to Dennis and Owen (1997), theorists such as Hyman (1959) and
Greenstein (1960) wrote that in the United States, "the foundations of political learning
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and political identity are thought to be established during the childhood years" (p. 49).
Sigel(1989) writes that Hyman believed such socialization would essentially be finished
by the high school years. Political scientists such as Easton and Dennis (1969) asserted
that in childhood, young people look up to political figures as trustworthy and deserving
of affection. According to this theory, these positive attitudes make it possible for the
adult to maintain a reservoir of goodwill toward government and politicians, even afier the
childlike sentiments have been tempered by skepticism (Stgel, 1989). These political
science theorists viewed the family, as well as school and peer groups, to be of primary
importance in helping to inculcate political attitudes, values, and behaviors.
Dennis and Owen (1997) argue that this kind of socialization model, which
stresses the importance of family and early learning, is not as useful for those studying
Generation X as it is for studying other, earlier age cohorts.

This is because of the

changing structure of the American family during the time that members of Generation X
were children. As discussed in Chapter I, many of these children grew up in single
parent households. Divorce rates increased at a rapid pace. At the same time, many
women went to work. According to Dennis and Owen (1997), "Parents were left with
less time and perhaps less inclination to teach then progeny about politics. As a result,
Gen-Xers often received fewer, less direct, and less homogenous political cues firom
family members over the course of their preadult political development" (p. 49).
Dennis and Owen (1997) believe that because of these changes in the family, GenXers are not as fully formed in their political identities when they reach voting age. They
further argue that the mass media play an enormous role in givingpolitical cues to these
young people. For example, they cite a Wtsconsm study conducted in 1980-81 which
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found that only 16 percent of preadult Gen-Xers got most of their political information
from their parents, while 30 percent of those surveyed got most of their political
information from television. The importance of mass media has not dhnmished for adult
Gen-Xers, according to Global Strategy Group 1996 data, which showed that 54 percent
of adult Gen-Xers studied receive most of their political information from television
(Dennis & Owen, 1997).
Graber (1984) contends that most of the political information that children receive
comes from the mass media. If this is true, then perhaps it has been more difficult for
children in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s to form the kind of idealization of political figures
that Easton and Dennis (1969) argued was desirable in political socialization. When
members of Generation X were growing up, the mass media showed presidents involved
in scandal—Nixon in Watergate, Reagan and Bush in the Iran-Contra episode, and, most
recently, Clinton in Whitewater and the Lewinslqr affair.
Further, Graber (1984) argues that when adults are resocialized—that is, when
they acquire new attitudes and ideas about politics in adulthood, it happens as a result of
information they get from mass media. She cites the shifts in attitudes toward race and
sex since the 1940s and 1950s as examples of such resocialization. Sigel(1989) agrees
with the perspective that socialization does not end at high school, and that a variety of
agents can continue to play a role in adult political socialization. For Generation X and
the Millennials, television has played an especially important role in socialization
throughout childhood, and may continue to be important throughout the adult years, as
resocialization takes place. The literature review that follows will address two theories of
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how mass media use is related to the political attitudes, involvement, interest levels, and
feelings ofefficacy.

Definitions of Terms
Just what is political engagement and how does it relate to other measures of
attitude and involvement, such as apathy, interest, cynicism, involvement, engagement,
confidence, and efficacy? Before reviewing relevant studies and relating them to this
study’s hypotheses, it is first necessary to define precisely how the terms political
engagement, cynicism, and interest are being used in this study.
Political engagement. In Broken Contract researchers Horn and Conway (1996)
write:
By ‘political engagement’ we mean interest in and attention to politics. Indicators
of engagement might include having a general interest in governmental and political
afiairs, following political campaigns, discussing political issues and candidates
with fiiends or family, and consuming the mass media’s political content
regardless of the format through which that content is conveyed.” (p. 110)
Horn and Conway (1996) measure engagement by using the same ANES survey
questions that measure interest in and attentiveness to politics. Political disengagement, it
would follow, is a lack of interest m and attention to politics. In this study,
disengagement is used as the umbrella term for many negative feelings toward politics, and
thus wül be used in a broader fashion. One who is disengaged could be described as bemg
distrustful and unsure of his or her own efficacy, as well as bemg disinterested and
mattentive to politics.
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Cynicism and trust, Erber and Lan (1990) equate political cynicism with distrust,
which is essentially how this study uses the term. Along with answering items adapted
from the American National Election Study (ANES) surveys (Craig, 1996) that were
specially designed to measure trust in government, students have also been asked to
identify their own level of cynicism. Students are left to use their own understanding of
the term, as the survey provides no further definition.
Apathy aad interest. Political scientist Stephen Earl Bennett (1986), in creating
his Political Apathy Index, attempted to rid the term “apathy” from such possible
meanings as absence of participation, psychopathological dispositions, and even trust,
cynicism, and alienation. Instead, Bennett uses the following, limited definition of the
term: “The concept of political apathy refers to the varying degrees to which people are
or are not interested in and attentive to politics and public afiairs” (p. 37). Throughout
this study, Bennett’s definition will apply.
Efficacy, In After the Boom. Owen (1997) defines feelings of political efficacy as
follows: “. . . the belief that one has the ability to effectively influence the political
process through voting and other forms of active involvement” (p. 87). She goes on to
explain that efficacy is related more closely to participation than is the concept of trust
Owen’s definition will apply throughout this study.

The Erosion of Social Capital
Putnam’s Theory
In recent years, Putnam (1994,1995) has described the importance of social
capital in the United States. According to Norris (199Q, “’Social capital’ is understood
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as the dense networks of norms and social trust which enable participants to cooperate in
the pursuit of shared objectives” (p. 474). In The Great Disruption. Fukuyama (1999)
explains why social capital is so important to the functioning of a democratic society. He
claims that it is social capital that impressed Alexis de Toqueville so much during his
travels in the United States. Fukuyama writes that de Toqueville believed the following:
American democracy and its system of limited government worked only because
Americans were so adept at forming associations for both civil and political
purposes. This ability to, in effect, self-organize not only meant that the
government did not have to impose order in a hierarchical, top-down manner; civil
association was also a “school of self-government” that taught people cooperative
habits they would carry over with them to public life. (p. 20)
Pumam (1994, 1995) argues that for social capital and trust to exist, individuals
need to interact with one another in the community. Looking at the decline of group
membership in general, Putnam (1994,1995) asserts that social capital has eroded over
the past several decades as, he believes, people spend less time interacting with each
other. One of the reasons that people spend less time interacting and therefore have less
social capital, according to his argument, is that people in the past few decades spend so
much of their time watching television. Fukuyama (1999) notes that the average
American watches television for more than four hours a day. This certainly would seem
to limit the time that they spend in face-to-face interaction.
Trust, as well as group membership, is an important indicator of social capital.
Pfou, Moy, Radier and Bridgeman (1998) cite research that shows declming levels of trust
in the Presidency, Congress, the news media, and government at the state level. Putnam
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(1994,1995) argues that the decline in trust is correlated with the increasing amount of
time that Americans have spent watching television and is most pronounced in the post
war generation (Norris, 1996). If the Baby Boom generation has lost social capital and
feelings of trust because their leisure and social group activities were displaced by
television, this author would argue that the same holds true for members of Generation X.
Putnam’s theory on the decline in social capital might therefore be important in explaining
young adults’ rising levels ofpolitical disengagement.
Putnam (1994,1995) reviewed the decline of many difîèrent types of group
membership (from bowling leagues to Parent-Teacher Associations to political parties) in
his research. This study, however, will focus on how this erosion of social capital affects
political engagement. In a study that used items measuring attention to television,
political participation, political interest, and efficacy, Norris (1996) found the following:
“people who watch a great deal of television know less about politics, feel less able to
affect government, and are less interested in politics” (p. 478). Given Norris’s findings,
the following predictions were made:
HI: Heavy use of television by students is negatively related to feelings of
political efficacy.
H2: Heavy use of television by students is negatively related to interest in
politics and government
Putnam (1995) found in his analysis of survey research that heavy television
viewing was associated with lower voting turnout and less social trust In light of
Putnam’s findings, the followmg prediction was made:
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H3: Heavy use of television by students is negatively related to political
involvement.
The next section of the paper will look at Gerbner’s cultivation theory and how
the largely negative portrayal of politics and government on television might affect heavy
viewers of television.

The Cultivation Process
The cultivation theory, proposed by George Gerbner, focuses on how television
presents the world, and on how long term exposure to this television world affects
people’s attitudes, beliefs, and values (Gerbner et al., 1984). According to Gerbner,
Gross, Morgan, and Signorielli (1986), "Television cultivates from infancy the very
predispositions and preferences that used to be acquired from other primary sources" (p.
18). These researchers believe that social scientists need to look at the total picture of
how television is used, and not simply at how specific types of programs affect viewers.
Indeed, these writers observe that, "What matters most for the study of television is not
so much what this or that viewer may prefer as what virtually no viewer can escape"
(Gerbner et al., 1986, p. 20).
Cultivation theory differs from earlier media effects research because it does not
emphasize the effects of a particular campaign or a specific type of marketing effort, but
rather how television use in general affects the viewer (Gerbner et al., 1986). According
to Gerbner et al. (1984) the effects of television might be very difficult to measure
because television is everywhere and its message is fairly homogenous. This means that
even non-viewers and light viewers may be indirectly influenced by television through
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their discussions with heavier viewers. If differences are found between light and heavy
viewers, it may be crucial in understanding how television makes an impact.
The theory was first proposed and tested in studies that focused on how
television exposure affected perceptions of violence in the world (e.g., Gerbner, 1972,
Gerbner & Gross, 1976, Gerbner, Gross, Eleey, Jackson-Breeck, Jeffiies-Fox, &
Signorielli, 1977). Through this series of studies, researchers found differences between
light and heavy viewers. Heavy viewers of television were more likely to have a distorted
view of social reality than light viewers were. The heavy viewers perceived that violence
was much more prevalent than it actually was.
Gerbner’s work on cultivation is part of a larger program of research called
Cultural Indicators, which is conducted at the Annenberg School of Communication at the
University of Pennsylvania (Jeffies, 1997). Cultural Indicators also focuses research on
how policies are made that affect the creation and flow of media content. Additionally,
there is a specific branch of research directed at “message system analysis” (Gerbner et
al., 1984). For message system analysis, a week’s worth of network television drama are
recorded armually and analyzed to determine the world that is being presented on
television.
In light of research findings that network television shows violence to occur at
least ten times as frequently as it does in the real world, it is understandable that heavy
viewers of television might believe that violence occurs more frequently (Gerbner et al.,
1984). Gerbner and his colleagues have noted other intrigumg discrepancies between the
television world and the real world. For example, television dramas do not include nearly
as many elderly people as exist in the real world, fit cultivation analysis, Gerbner, Gross,
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Morgan, and Signorielli (1980) found that heavy viewers are more likely to believe that
there are fewer elderly than there used to be and that they don’t live as long.
Other message analysis research conducted during the 1980s found that there are
three men for every woman on television network dramas. Women on television tend to
be younger than their male counterparts. In cultivation analysis, researchers found that
most groups of heavy viewers hold more sexist attitudes and beliefs than light viewers
(Gerbner et al., 1984).
Young people depend on television for information about politics and government.
As Chaffee and Frank (1996) note, “Television is the principal channel by which young
people in America and other Western democracies first encounter politics” (p. 56). If
cultivation theory is correct, important differences between light and heavy viewers of
television might be found for a variety of issues, beliefs, and attitudes. As this study
deals specifically with politics and government, it will focus on the way that television
portrays politics and government

Negative Election Coverage on Television
Much communication research has focused on political coverage on network
television during presidential campaigns. Lichter, Noyes, and Kaid (1999) looked at the
candidates’ “sound bites”—the amount of time that candidates’ images were shown on
screen accompanied by their words. In 1968, the average “sound bite” was 42 seconds
(Patterson, 1993). In 1996, the candidates’ “sound bites” averaged only about 82
seconds. Journalists covermg the campaign had about six times as much anthne as the
candidates themselves, which thqr spent in discussmg and analyzing the campaign. The
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tone of the discussions and analysis was negative, for the most part, especially the
coverage of Bob Dole (Lichter, Noyes, & Kaid, 1999).
Patterson (1993) argued that journalist’s coverage of politics is organized by a
specific schema—the idea that “politics is a strategic game” (p. 57). Within this schema,
candidates’ actions and words are evaluated in terms of their strategic importance to
getting elected. This type of coverage has become much more prevalent in the past thirty
years (Patterson, 1993). As a result, Americans who rely on the media for information on
politics find out much more about candidate strategies than they do about their
substantive stands on various issues. These strategies are often portrayed in cynical
terms. Graber (1984) found that when news stories focused on issues, people were more
likely to want to take action. On the other hand, when news stories focused on the game,
people felt less involved and felt more resigned to candidates’ behavior.
In Out of Order. Patterson (1993) wrote about the increasmgly negative tone that
journalists take toward politics and the consequences it has for the American electorate.
According to Patterson, during the 1992 election,
. . . more than 80 percent of network news stories on the Democratic party were
negative; 87 percent of all references to the Republican party were unfavorable.
Congress was portrayed as a human cesspool: 90 percent of news regarding it was
bad. The federal government fared even worse: 93 percent negative (p. 18).
Cultivation theory suggests that this overwhelmingly negative depiction of both
politicians and government institutions should have an effect over time on television
viewers. As negative coverage of politics and politicians has increased markedly over the
course of the past thirty years (Patterson, 1993), young viewers might be particularly
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affected by it, having never experienced a more positive media depiction of politics.
Therefore, this study will explore the following hypothesis:
H4: Heavy use of television by students is positively related to negative
assessments of politics and politicians.

NegativeCampaigns
Some scholars argue that like the press, politicians and their campaigns on
television have contributed to Americans’ lack of confidence in govermnent. In Why
Americans Hate Politics. E. J. Dionne (1991) contends that political advertisements have
become increasingly negative. Ideally, our form of government should focus on what
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. called “the search for remedy” (Dionne, 1991, p. 16), looking
toward solutions to real problems in the country. However, Dionne believes that since the
1960s, liberals and conservatives have consistently focused in political advertisements on
character attacks and divisive issues that leave Americans feeling frustrated. Dionne
(1991) writes:
The decline of a “politics of remedy” creates of vicious cycle. Campaigns have
become negative in large part because of a sharp decline in popular faith in
government. To appeal to an increasmgly alienated electorate, candidates and their
political consultants have adopted a cynical stance that, they believe with good
reason, plays into popular cynicism about politics and thus wins them votes. But
cynical campaigns do not resolve issues. They do not lead to “remedies.”
Therefore, problems get worse, the electorate becomes more cynical—and so does
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the advertising. At the end of it all, the governing process, which is supposed to
be about real things, becomes little more than a war over symbols, (p. 17)
According to this argument, the symbols that have become important in political
advertising are not relevant to competence in government. The public realizes that these
merely symbolic issues are not important, and become less trusting as a result (Dionne,
1991).
Pfau et al. (1998) assert that Robinson (1975,1976, 1977) started the line of
studies that first focused the relationship between television and lack of trust in
institutions. Robinson coined the term “videomalaise” to describe the effect that
television had on its viewers. He believed that the increasingly negative tone of news
coverage caused viewers to feel cynical. Robinson (1976) wrote the following about the
news coverage of American institutions: “It seems reasonable to assume that these antiinstitutional themes reach the audience with one essential message: none of our national
policies work, none of our institutions respond, none of our political organizations
succeed (p. 429, in Pfau et al., 1998, p. 92).
Jamieson, Waldman, and Devett (1998) write that both the campaigners and news
coverage of the campaign exacerbated the problem for viewers in 1996. Politicians
avoided the press and distorted their opponents’ views. The news media continued to
focus on strategy instead of issues. Coverage also over-reported the attacks that
candidates made on each other. At the same time, news coverage did not report the
inaccuracies that were present m the political advertisements.
As heavy television viewers caimot avoid presidential campaigns and the strategic
coverage of govermnent, the followingprediction was made:
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H5: Heavy use of television by students is negatively related to trust in
government institutions.

Modified Cultivation Theory
While Gerbner’s cultivation theory suggests that mass media presents users with a
relatively homogenous view of the world, other communication scholars, such Hawkins
and Pingree (1981) and Potter (1993) have argued against this view. These researchers
assert that “the cultivation of perceptions should be unique to content genres” (Pfau et al.,
1998, p. 94). Pfau et al. (1998) used a modified form of the cultivation theory in their
quantitative study of how mass media use affects public confidence in democratic
institutions. The study included a content analysis of television news, print media, and
political talk radio. These researchers found that “users of specific communication
sources tend to perceive institutions as those sources depict them, sometimes positively,
or, as in the case of national television news and political talk radio, negatively” (p. 107).
In this study, Pfau et al. (1998) presented their content analysis findings about
which communication sources presented institutions in the most negative light. When
looking at coverage of the Office of the Presidency, they found that network television
news was more negative than local television news. They found that depictions of the
Presidency were even more negative on television entertainment talk shows, such as Late
Night with David Letterman and The Tonight Show with Jav Leno. Whenlookmgat
coverage of Congress, th ^ found that the most negative depiction occurred on the
entertainment talk shows, and that netwodc news was again more negative than local
news.
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In a study that focused on how television viewing is related to civic engagement,
Norris (1996) looked at the total amount of time viewers spent watching television. She
also looked at which television programs viewers watched, including television news and
public affairs programs. Norris found that heavy viewers of television were “less
interested in national and local community politics, and less likely to engage in political
discussions” (p. 476). However, she also found that viewers of network news and public
affairs programs were “more likely to be involved in all types of political activity. . . ” (p.
476).
Norris’s study suggests that television use may have a negative effect on political
activity, but that the specific content of the types of television programs that viewers
watch may override this generally negative effect. Norris, however, looked at two genres
that would appeal to those most apt to be interested in politics—network news and
public affairs programs. This study will examine how political activity is related to
viewing different types of programs, such as late night television talk shows and political
talk shows. The study will also examine the relationship between the types of television
programs that students watch and their attitudes toward govenunent.
Participants have answered questions about what sorts of programs they watch,
so that the following research question may be addressed.
RQl ; What is the relationship between political involvement and the types of
television programs that students watch?
RQ2: What is the relationship between attitudes toward government and the
types of television programs that studoits watch?
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METHODOLOGY

Design
The principal questions that this study explores concern the relationship between
television viewing and political attitudes and political involvement. The study has been
developed for a thesis and has been conducted through survey research. The surveys were
handed out to students during class time and in their usual classrooms. The surveys were
administered in late March, 2000—after many major primaries in the 2000 presidential
election had taken place.
Participants
The participants for this study are undergraduate students at University of
Nevada, Las Vegas. There were approximately 50 students who filled out the survey in
two sections of an interpersonal communication classes and about 40 students who filled
out the survey in two sections of a speech communication class. Approximately another
20 students filled out the survey in an introductory course on gender, race, and class. The
students were selected non-randomly—as undergraduate students, they were readily
available for research. The Office of Sponsored Programs at the University of Nevada,
Las Vegas approved the project, after reviewing the protocol.
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Measurement
The survey mcludes forty-eight close-ended questions (see Appendix 1). The
questions, except where indicated, were adapted from items used in the American
National Election Study (ANES) surveys from 1964 through 1992. These questions
appear in Craig (1996, pp. 295-300).
The first section of the survey measures political and ideological selfidentification. For the first question, participants indicated whether they identified with
any political party by circling (1) Republican; (2) Democrat; (3) Independent; or (4) none
of the above. In the next question, participants indicated on a seven-point scale where
they would place their political views, with (1) indicating extremely liberal and (7)
indicating extremely conservative.
So that the study could measure their level of trust in government, students then
marked on two 7-point scales where they would place their own attitude toward politics
and politicians. On the first of these scales, 1 = not at all cynical and 7 = extremely
cynical. In the next scale, 1 = not at all trusting and 7 - extremely trusting. These two
questions were not adapted fix>m previous ANES surveys.
In the next section of the survey, participants answered a series of questions
designed to measure their level of political involvement These questions, again, were
adapted from items used in the ANES surveys (Craig, 1996, pp. 295-300).
Ffrst for item 5, participants indicated how often th ^ fr)llow what’s going on in
government and public afiairs, using a scale in which 1 = most of the time and 4 = hardly
at all. Next, for item 6, participants indicated how mterested they have been in the
presidential campaign so far this year, usmg a scale m which I = very much interested and
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4 = not at all interested. Then, for item 7, participants indicated how much they
personally care about who wins the presidential election this fall, using a scale in which I
= very much and 4 = not at all.
For items 8-11, students answered questions about how often they paid attention
to the campaign through different communication chaimels. For each of these questions,
participants used a scale in which 1 = daily; 2 = 3-5 times a week; 3 = once or twice a
week; 4 = once or twice a month; and 5 = rarely. For question 8, participants marked
how often they listen to speeches, debates, or discussions about the campaign on the
radio. For question 9, participants marked how often they pay attention to information
about the campaign on the Internet. For question 10, students marked how often they
watch programs about the campaign on television. For question 11, they marked how
often they discuss politics with family or friends.
For question 12, students used the above scale to indicate how often they will talk
to people and try to show them why they should vote for or against one of the parties or
candidates during the campaign.
Participants indicated their responses by marking (1) yes or (2) no for questions
13-17. For question 13, they indicated whether they would wear a campaign button, put
a campaign sticker on their car, or place a sign in their window or in the front of their
house. For question 14, students marked whether they would go to any political
meetings, rallies, speeches, diimers, or things like that in support of a particular candidate.
For question 15, participants indicated whether th^r would do any other work for one of
the parties or candidates. For question 16, partic^ants answered whether th ^ listened
to radio shows where people call in to voice their opmions. Finally, for question 17,
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students indicated whether they watch talk shows on T. V. where people call in to voice
their opinions.
All of these items on political involvement (items 5 —17) were then used to create
an index of political involvement. This index has an alpha reliability of .8624. The mean
for this index is 37.8131, and the range is 27.00.
In the following section of the survey, participants answered a series o f questions
designed to measure their feelings of political efficacy. For questions 18-22, participants
indicated their reaction to each one of a series of statements using a five-point scale in
which 1 = agree strongly and 5 = disagree strongly. The statements were as follows: (18)
“I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our
coimtry;” (19) “1 consider myself well-qualified to participate in politics;” (20) “I feel
that 1could do as good a job in public office as most other people;” (21) “1think I am
better informed about politics and government than most people;” and (22) “Sometimes
politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can’t really
understand what’s going on.” Items 18-21 were then used to create an index of political
efficacy, which has an alpha reliability of .8340. The mean for this index is 13.1009, and
the range is 16.00.
The next section o f the survey measures general attitudes about govermnent and
politics. For question 23, participants indicated how much of the time they think they
can trust the government in Washington to do what is right by marking (1) always; (2)
most of the tune; or (3) only some of the time. For question 24, students marked whether
they think that people in the government waste tæc m on^ by circling (1) they waste a lot
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of the money; (2) they waste some of the money; or (3) they don’t waste very much of
the money.
For question 25, participants indicated their attitude about how the government is
run by circling (1) It’s run by a few big interests looking out for themselves; or (2) It’s
run for the benefit of all the people. For question 26, students marked how many
crooked people they think there are miming the government by circling (1) quite a few;
(2) not very many; or (3) hardly any.
For question 27, participants indicated whether they think that public officials
care much what people like them think by circling (1) yes, they care very much, (2) they
care some, or (3) no, they don’t care much. For both questions 28 and 29, participants
chose from the following answers; (I) a good deal; (2) some; or (3) not much. Question 28
addresses how much attention they feel the government pays to what the people think
when it makes decisions by circling. Question 29 addresses how much they feel that
having elections makes the government pay attention to what the people think.
For questions 30 and 31, students indicated their reaction to statements by using
a seven-point scale where 1 = limited interest and 7 = a great deal of interest The
statements are as follows: (30) “How much interest would you say you have in the
Office of the Presidency?”; and (31) “How much interest would you say you have in
Congress?” Interest in government institutions is an important variable in the study.
For questions 32 and 33, students indicated their answers usmg a five-point scale
in which 1 = approve strongly and 5 = distqiprove strongly. Question 32 asks how
students foel about the way the president is handling his job. Question 33 asks how
students foel about the way that members of Congress are handling their jobs. These
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questions were included to measure students’ assessments of politicians, another
important variable for this study.
For question 34, students indicated how often they used different media by using
a scale of 1 through 10, where 1 means “rarely” and 10 means “frequently.” They marked
responses for local TV news, network TV news, late-night TV entertainment talk shows,
TV political talk shows, and Internet news sources.
Questions 35 and 36 were not adapted from the ANES surveys. These questions
are designed to address the issue of whether the political coverage currently available
through media addresses yoimg people. Students indicated their responses using a scale
in which 1 = very often; 2 = sometimes; and 3 = rarely. They answered how often they
feel that political issues covered on television are relevant for their age group and how
often they feel that shows with political content are targeted toward their age group.
In the next section, items 37 and 38 measure amount of media use. Students
answered either (I) one hour or less; (2) two or three hours; or (3) four or more hours to
questions about how many hours a day they spend watching TV and how many hours a
day they spend on the Internet Amount of television viewing is a critical variable for this
study. For the purposes of this study, students watching TV one hour or less are
considered light viewers. Those watching TV two or three hours a day are considered
moderate viewers. Those watchmg TV for four or more hours are considered heavy
viewers. These labels are based on the work of Gerbner et al. (1984).
The remaining questions are for demographic purposes and for information on
voting behavior. For question 39, participants mdicated how old they were so that it
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would be possible to look at age as a variable. They marked one of the following
categories: (1)18-21; (2) 22-29; (3) 30-39; (4) 40-49; (5) 50-59; (6) 60 or older.
For question 40, participants answered yes (2) or no (1) to show whether they
were old enough to vote in the last presidential election. Participants then answered
whether or not they voted in the last presidential election. If they answered yes to
voting, they then circled who they voted for-(l) Clinton, (2) Perot, (3) Dole, or (4) other.
This question was included as one indication of prior political involvement.
For question 43, participants circled (1) no, (2) maybe, or (3) yes to show
whether or not they planned to vote in the next presidential election. If they answered
yes to planning to vote, they then circled who they planned to vote for—(1) Gore, (2)
Bush, or (3) other. This question was included as another indication of political
involvement
For question 45, participants circled whether they were (1) male or (2) female, so
that sex could be looked at as a variable. For question 46, participants circled (1) no or
(2) yes to show whether or not they had children. This question was included so that it
would be possible to look at whether or not specific attitudes toward politics and
politicians were correlated with parenthood. For question 47, participants circled (1) no
or (2) yes to show whether they were married.
Finally, for question 48, participants indicated their race, by marking one the
following six groups: 1) White; 2) Afiican-American; 3) Asian American/Pacfiic Islander;
4) Latino/Mexican-American; 5) Native American; 6) Other (please specify).
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Procedure
The researcher asked participants to fill out the surveys at the beginning of their
classes- First, the instructor made a brief announcement, explaining to students what the
research was for, assuring them that it was voluntary, and promising to share the results
with them. Then, the instructor handed the survey (see Appendix 1) along with a cover
letter to students. Students completed the survey in fifteen to twenty minutes.
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CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

An Overview of Responses
The Subjects
There were 109 students surveyed. Of these students, 36% (39) were male and
64% (70) were female. Most of these respondents were fairly young—61.5% (67) were
between 18 and 21,27.5% (30) were between 22 and 29,6.4% (7) were between 30-39,
and just 4.6% (5) were 40-49 years old. Most respondents, about 83% (90), were not
married. The vast majority, 88% (96) of respondents, did not have children. The sample
was fairly diverse—about 69% (75) of those surveyed identified themselves as white,
about 5% (5) as Afiican American, about 14%(14) as Asian American/Pacific Islander,
about 6% (7) as Latino or Mexican, and about 2% (2) as Native American.

Political Self-Identification and Election Items
In terms of their partisan identification, about 36% (39) of the participants
thought of themselves as Republican, about 32% (34) as Democrats, and about 11% (12)
as Independents. About 21% (22) of respondents did not think of themselves as falling
into any of these party categories.

43
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

44

About 28% (31) of respondents care very much who wins the presidential election
this year and approximately 42% (46) care somewhat However, this concern may not
translate into a great deal of action. In terms of trying to persuade others about who to
vote for, 77% (84) indicated that they would rarely talk to other people and try to show
them why they should vote for or against one of the parties or candidates. About 84%
(92) of respondents marked that they would not wear a campaign button, put a campaign
sticker on their car, or place a sign in the window or in front of the house. About 80%
(87) marked that they would not go to any political meetings, rallies, speeches, dinners or
things like that in support of a candidate. Approximately another 82% (88) indicated that
they would not do any other work for one of the parties or candidates.
On the other hand, about 57% (62) of students plan to vote in the next presidential
election. About 28% (31) answer “maybe” to voting, while about 15% (16) do not plan
to vote. For those who do plan to vote, about 34% (23) plan to vote for Gore and about
49% (33) plan to vote for Bush. About 16% (11) marked “other.” This is striking
because of the predominance of women in the survey sample. Perhaps the gender gap,
which would predict that women would be more likely to vote for Democrats than
Republican candidates, is shifting ground in this race. Of the approximately 28% (31) of
students who voted in the last presidential election, about 68% (21) voted for Clinton,
while only about 23% (7) voted for Dole.

Media Use and Political Coverage
On an average day, about 16% (17) of respondents watch television fr)r four or
more hours, about 46% (50) for 2 or 3 hours, and 38.5% (42) for one hour or less. About
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32% (35) of respondents believe that political issues covered on television are rarely
relevant for their age group, and about 43% (47) believe that shows with political content
are rarely targeted toward their age group.
Just 5.5% (6) of students spend four or more hours on the Internet, while about
24% (26) spend 2 or 3 hours, and about 71% (77) spend one hour or less on the Internet.

Statistical Analysis of the Data
The Hvpotheses
The hypotheses and research questions explored here have to do with television
viewing and political involvement, interest, efBcacy, and trust. To test each of the
following hypotheses, a bivariate correlation was used.
The first hypothesis predicted that students' heavy use of television would be
negatively related to feelings of political efBcacy. No significant relationship was found
between the number of hours students spent watching television and their feelings of
political efBcacy, which were measured through an index of items described in Chapter 3
(r = .152, p = .114). Interestingly, however, the study did find significant relationships
between feelings of political efBcacy and types of television programs that students
watch. Frequent viewing of local television news was sîgnffîcantly related to feelings of
political efBcacy (r=-231, with p < .05). Frequent viewmg of network television news
was also significantly related to foelmgs of political efBcacy (rj= -.317, p < .05). Finally,
frequent viewmg of television political talk shows, such as larrv King, was significantly
related to feelings of political efBcacy (r= -.414, p < .01). Frequent viewers of local
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news, network news, and political talk shows have feelings of greater political efBcacy
than do infrequent viewers.
The second hypothesis predicted that students’ heavy use of television would be
negatively related to interest in politics and government No correlation was found
between the number of hours spent watching television and any of the three measures of
interest in politics. The first item measured students’ self-reported interest level in
politics (r = .050, p = .608). The second item measured students’ interest in the Office of
the Presidency (r= .057, p = .553). The third item measured students’ interest in
Congress (r = .002, p = .980). On the other hand, the study did find significant
relationships between the types of television programs that students watched for all three
measures. Those who frequently watch local news report a higher interest level in politics
and politicians than less frequent viewers (r = -.189, p < .05). Those who frequently
watch network news also report a higher interest in politics and politicians than less
frequent viewers (r = -223, p < .05). Likewise, those who watch political talk shows
report a higher interest in politics and politicians (r -J27, p = .001).
Students who watch political talk shows are more interested than less frequent
viewers in the Office of the Presidency (r = 220, p < .05) and in Congress (r = .305, p <
.01). Significant relationship were also found between frequent viewing of television
network news and mterest in the Office of the Presidency (r = .312, p < .01), as well as
interest in Congress (r= 289, p < .05). Frequent viewers of local news report higher
interest in the Office of the Presidency (r=234, p < .05). These frequent viewers of
local news were also more likely to be mterested m Congress (r = 229, p < .05).
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The third hypothesis predicted that students’ heavy use of television would be
negatively related to political involvement. In order to test this hypothesis, the researcher
used an index of involvement, which had an alpha reliability of .8624. No significant
relationship was found between the number of hours spent watching television and
political involvement (r = .052, p = .593). Again, however, the study found significant
relationships between the types of television programs which students watched and their
political involvement. See the following section on Research Questions for more
information.
The fourth hypothesis predicted that students’ heavy use of television would be
positively related to negative assessments of politics and politicians. Although no
significant relationship was found between television use and assessments of Congress (r
= .111. p =.252). there was a significant relationship between television use and
assessments of the President (r = -200, p < .037). However, the relationship runs
counter to that which was predicted—the more television that participants watch, the
more likely they are to give the president a positive Job approval rating.
The fifth hypothesis predicted that heavy use of television would be negatively
related to trust in government. The study found no significant relationship between the
number of hours spent watching television and any of the six measures of trust. The first
item measured attitudes of trust toward politics and politicians (r = .082, p = 269). The
second item measured cynical attitudes toward politics and politicians (r = ,072, p =
.457). The third item measured how often the respondent trusted the government in
Washington to do what is right (r = .055, p = 296). The fourth item measured whether
the respondent believes government wastes a lot of tax money (r - .058, p = .573). The

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

48

fifth item measured whether the participant believes the government was run by a few big
interests or for the benefit of all the people (r = .016, p = .873). The sixth item measured
the respondent’s belief about how many people in the government are crooked (r = -.089,
p = .358). Although none of these measures were correlated to the number o f hours that
the students spent watching TV, significant relationships were found between the types of
television programs that students watched and their feelings of trust in government. Read
the following section on the Research Questions for more information.

The Research Questions
The two research questions explore how the types of television programs which
students watch relate to their general levels of political engagement, which includes
involvement in politics and positive attitudes toward politics and government. The first
question asked about the relationship between the ^ e s of television programs which
students watch and political involvement. No correlation was found between how
frequently viewers watched late night entertainment talk shows and their political
involvement (r = .080, p = .420). A strong correlation (r = -.319, p < .01) was found
between how frequently participants viewed local news and their political involvement.
Similarly, a strong correlation (r = -280, p < .01) was found between how frequently
participants viewed network news and their political involvement. Finally, a strong
correlation was found between how frequently respondents view political talk shows and
then: political involvement

-.435, p < . 01 at .000).

The second research question asked about the relationsh^ between attitudes
toward government and the types of television programs that students watch. The study
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found some significant relationships. First, local television news viewing was negatively
related to trust that the government in Washington will do what is right (r = 254, p <
.01). Those who watch local television news frequently are more apt to believe that you
can trust the government in Washington only some of the time.
Second, a significant relationship was found between viewing of late-night
entertainment talk shows and attitudes toward politics and politicians. More frequent
viewing of late-night entertainment talk shows such as Late Night with David Letterman
and The Tonight Show was negatively related to high levels of cynicism toward politics
and politicians (r = -210, p < .05). Frequent viewing of these late-night entertainment
talk shows was positively related to high levels of trust toward politics and politicians (r
=230, p < .05). That is, those who frequently watch late-night talk shows are less apt to
be cynical and more apt to be trusting toward politics and politicians than less-frequent
viewers.
Finally, a moderately strong correlation was found between the president’s job
approval rating and viewing of political talk shows (r = -.191, p < .05). Those who watch
political talk shows frequently are more apt to give the president a higherjob approval
rating.
These findings will be highlighted and discussed in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTERS

DISCUSSION

Summary of Findings
This study has demonstrated that there seems to be no relationship between the
overall amount of television which students watch and their political involvement, their
sense of efficacy, and their interest in politics. The study also has demonstrated that
there is some relationship between the types of television programs which students watch
and their attitudes toward politics and politicians. Finally, the study has demonstrated
that there is also some relationship between the types of television programs which
students watch and their political involvement. In this chapter, the findings for each of
the hypotheses and research questions will be highlighted and discussed.

Discussion of Hypotheses and Research Questions
Contrary to previous research findings (Norris, 1996), this study found no support
for the first hypothesis, which predicted that students’ heavy use of television would be
negatively related to feelings of political efficacy. The lack of support for this and for the
hypotheses that follow may result from limitations within, the study itself. One of the
limitations of the study is the feet that a convenience sample was used. This sample may
not be representative of the average college student. These students may also be

50

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

51

unrepresentative in that many of the students work full time—thus, they have less time to
watch television. Indeed, although Fukuyama (1999) writes that the average American
watches television for four or more hours a day, only about 16% (17) of the 109 student
respondents answered that they watched for that amount of time. Of course, it is
possible that students gave what they considered to be the socially desirable response,
which might seem to be a lighter amount of television viewing.
The study found no support for the second hypothesis, which predicted that
students’ heavy use of television would be negatively related to interest in politics and
government. This finding is contrary to Norris’s (1996) study, in which she found that
heavy viewers were less interested in politics and government than light viewers. As
stated above, only a very small sample of the survey population admitted to being heavy
viewers. On the other hand, quite a large number of students (54% or 59 students)
placed themselves toward the uninterested end of the scale measuring interest level in
politics. Because this study focuses mainly on young adults, perhaps there were more
participants uninterested in politics on the whole, regardless of their television-viewing
habits.
The third hypothesis predicted that students’ heavy use of television would be
negatively related to political involvement. Contrary to Putnam’s (1995) research which
indicated that heavy viewmg was associated with lower voter turnout and less voter trust,
no support was found for this hypothesis. This is somevfeat surprising, especially given
Graberis (1984) findings that when more news stories are presented on the “game” of
politics than on issues, as news stories currently do, viewers feel less involved.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

52

No support was found for the fourth hypothesis, which predicted that students’
heavy use of television would be positively related to negative assessments of politics
and politicians. In fact, the students who spent more time watching television were more
likely to give the president a positive ]oh approval rating. One might speculate that this is
because the current president, with his telegenic communication skills, is able to override
the negative coverage generally given to the Office of the Presidency. It will be
interesting to see if, as presidents change in the years to come, heavy viewers will
continue to be more likely to give the current president a higher approval rating.
The fifth hypothesis predicted that students’ heavy use of television would be
negatively related to trust in government In earlier studies, Putnam (1995) did find a
relationship between heavy television viewing and decreased voter trust and Robinson
(1975,1976,1977) found an association between television news viewing and loss of
trust for the government However, no support was found for the fifth hypothesis in this
study.
The study also posed the following research question: What is the relationship
between attitudes toward government and the types of television programs that students
watch? Interestingly, those students who fiequently watch local news were more apt to
believe that they can trust the government in Washington to do what is right only some o f
the time (as opposed to always or most of the time). This finding is somewhat surprising
given Pfau et al.’s (1998) content analysis, which showed that television local news is
less negative toward Congress and the President than network news. It is possible that
local news in Nevada provides a particularly negative view of the government in
Washmgton, with its often predominantly negative coverage of the Bureau o f Land
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Management and the Department of Energy. However, this study did not include any
content analysis of Las Vegas local news to back up such speculation.
A more surprising finding is that those students who frequently watch late night
entertainment talk shows feel more trusting toward politics and politicians than less
frequent viewers, given the fact that on these shows, politicians are regularly joked about
and generally referred to derisively. In fact, Pfau et al. (1998) found that entertainment
talk shows depicted both Congress and the Presidency more negatively than any of the
other types of shows they looked a t Yet it is clear that politicians find these shows
useful—just this year, both John McCain and George Bush appeared on late-night talk
shows during the 2000 presidential primary race. In his race for New York senator. New
York City Mayor Rudolph Guiliani has appeared several times on Late Show with David
Letterman. Hillary Clinton has also appeared with Letterman, just as her husband
famously appeared playing the saxophone on Arsenio Hall’s talk show. Perhaps as more
politicians use these shows to appeal directly to the viewers, the viewers respond by
feeling greater trust toward them. This would support van Zoonen’s (1998) thesis that
mastery of popular culture has become and will continue to be increasingly important for
politicians.
The study also posed the following research question: What is the relationship
between political involvement and the ^ e s of television programs that students watch?
The findings were clear: Those who frequently watch local television news, network
news, and political talk shows have a higher involvement level in politics than those who
watch less often. This runs contrary to predictions based on the woric of Putnam, which
suggests that television viewing m general will be accompanied by a lessening of civic
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participation. However, one of Norris’s (1996) findings was similar. In her study, she
found that “Those who regularly tuned into the network news were significantly more
likely to be involved in all types of political activity. . . ” (Norris, 1996, p. 476).
One of the suppositions underlying my hypotheses was that young people are
getting their political cues from television (as opposed to their families or political
parties). These yoimg people, it has been argued, feel that the media and political
marketing forces are ignoring them. Therefore, if they are spending a great deal of time
watching television, they are more likely to become disengaged from politics. Indeed,
this study found that those who are least involved in politics are most likely to feel that
television political coverage is not targeted toward their age group and that television
political cover%e is not relevant for their age group. However, the study also found that
those students who do frequently watch television news and political talk shows are more
likely to feel that political coverage on television is targeted to and relevant for their age
group. In an era where political discussions take place less often and party loyalty is
diminishing, perhaps television actually sometimes serves to promote interest in politics.

Suggestions for Future Research
Given the findings of this study, future research might focus more specifically on
how viewing television network news and political talk shows are related positively to
political mvolvement and efficacy. Are students who are more interested in politics more
inclined to watch television coverage of politics? Since this study found that those who
watch these shows tend to be more involved and interested in politics, it would also be
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interesting to look more closely at the reasons why some students choose not to watch
these shows.
Another interesting finding to pursue is the relationship between frequent viewing
of local television news and feelings that the government in Washington can be trusted to
do what is right only some of the time. Is this distrust unique to the student population in
Nevada, or might it be more generalizable? It would be useful to study this relationship
in several different areas of the country, while doing content analyses of the local news in
those areas to see how coverage might differ.
Finally, future research might look more closely at the relationship between
frequent viewing of late-night entertainment talk shows and greater feelings of trust
toward politics and politicians. Which shows specifically seem to encourage these
feelings of greater trust? Are they shows where politicians themselves frequently appear?
Would this relationship change over time—for example, would this relationship exist
during a major political scandal, such as the Clinton/Lewinslty affair? Future research
might look at the relationship during off-year elections as well, when not as many
prominent politicians would appear on the talk shows. MacManus (1996) wrote that onequarter of Americans between 18 and 29 watch these shows fairly often and a third of
these viewers admit that these shows are sometimes their first source of news about
campaigns and candidates. For those young people who are not regularly viewing
television news and political talk shows, these talk shows still seem to provide some
important cues about politics and politicians.
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Conclusions
The findings of this study would indicate that Norris (1996) is correct when she
suggests that the relationship between television viewing and engagement “is more
complex than sometimes suggested” (p. 479). The study’s findings do not seem to
support Putnam’s (1994,1995) work, which posits that the amount of time people spend
watching television is a root cause of civic disengagement.
The study also supports the modified approach to the cultivation theory, which
suggests that “the cultivation of perceptions should be unique to content genres ”(Pfau et
al, 1998, p. 94). That is, the sheer amount of time students spend watching television in
general seems to be less important than the types of programs they are watching in
determining their level of political engagement. However, Pfau et al.’s (1998) study
provided support for the notion that “users of specific communication sources tend to
perceive institutions as those sources depict them, sometimes positively, or as in the case
of national television news and political talk radio, negatively” (p. 107). Their content
analyses of specific types of programs showed that late-night talk shows depicted both
Congress and the Presidency in a negative light. The current study, on the other hand,
found that students who watched television late-night entertainment talk shows feel
greater trust toward politics and politicians. It would be useful to figure out the reason
for such a discrepancy. One interesting possibility is that, in this age of celebrityworship, students’ understanding of what counts as a negative depiction might run
counter to the expectations of researchers.
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Finally, the study suggests that both the amount of television viewing and the
types of television programs which students watch do not seem to be related to students’
disengagement from politics. Indeed, those who watch television news and political talk
shows feel more involved and more effective than less frequent viewers. Rather than
being related to disengagement, then, television seems to provide opportunity for greater
political engagement. If politicians, the news media, and the government itself could find
a way through television to capture the interest of the members of Generation X and their
younger brothers and sisters who are not currently watching television news and political
talk shows, they might help to further the political engagement of these yoimg viewers.
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SURVEY

[The following questions were adapted from the American National Election Study
(ANES) surveys from 1964-1992 (in Craig, 1996, p. 295-300)]
Please mark only one answer for each question.
Partisan Self-Identification
I. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a
L Republican
2. Democrat
3. Independent
4. none of the above
2. Here is a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are
arranged from extremely liberal ( 1) to extremely conservative (7). Where would you
place yourself on this scale?
extremely liberal
1

___ ___ _________ _____ ___ extremely conservative
2
3
4
5
6
7

3. Please place yourself on the following seven-point scales to indicate your attitude
toward politics and politicians.
not at all cynical

___ ___ _________ _____ ___ extremely cynical
2
3
4
5
6
7

1
not at all trusting

___ _____________ _____ ___ extremely trusting
2
3
4
5
6
7

I

4. Please place yourself on this seven-point scale to indicate your interest level in
politics.
extremely interested
1

___
2

extremely uninterested
3

4

5

6

7
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Political Involvement
5. Some people seem to follow what’s going on in government and public affairs
most of the time, whether there’s an election going on or not Others aren’t that
interested. Would you say you follow what’s going on in government and public
affairs
1. most of the time
2. some of the time
3. only now and then
4. hardly at all
6. Some people don’t pay much attention to political campaigns. How about you?
Would you say that watching the presidential campaign so far this year, you have
been
1. very much interested
2. somewhat interested
3. not much interested
4. not at all interested
7. Would you say that you personally care about who wins the presidential election
this fall
1. very much
2. somewhat
3. not much
4. not at all
8. How often do you listen to any speeches, debates, or discussions about the campaign
on the radio?
1. daily
2. 3-5 times a week
3. once or twice a week
4. once or twice a month
5. rarely
9. How often do you pay attention to information about the campaign on the Internet?
1. daily
2. 3-5 times a week
3. once or twice a week
4. once or twice a month
5. rarely
10. How often do you watch any programs about the campaign on television?
1. daily
2. 3-5 times a week
3. once or twice a week
4. once or twice a month
5. rarely
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II. How often do you discuss politics with your family or friends?
1. daily
2. 3-5 times a week
3. once or twice a week
4. once or twice a month
5. rarely

12. During the campaign, how often will you talk to people and try to show them why
they should vote for or against one of the parties or candidates?
1. daily
2. 3-5 times a week
3. once or twice a week
4. once or twice a month
5. rarely
13. During the campaign, would you wear a campaign button, put a campaign sticker
on your car, or place a sign in your window or in the front of your house?
1.' Yes
2. No
14. During the campaign, would you go to any political meetings, rallies, speeches,
dinners, or things like that in support of a particular candidate?
1. Yes
2. No
15. During the campaign, would you do any other work for one of the parties or
candidates?
1. Yes
2. No
16. Do you listen to radio shows where people call in to voice their opinions?
I. Yes
2- No
17. Do you watch talk shows on T. V. where people call in to voice their opinions?
1. Yes
2. No
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Effectiveness
Please circle only one answer for each question. Indicate your reaction to the
following statements:
18.1 feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing
our country.
1. agree strongly
2. agree
3. neutral
4. disagree
5. disagree strongly
19.1 consider myself well-qualified to participate in politics.
1. agree strongly
2. agree
3. neutral
4. disagree
5. disagree strongly
20.1 feel that I could do as good a job in public office as most other people.
1. agree strongly
2. agree
3. neutral
4. disagree
5. disagree strongly
21.1 think I am better informed about politics and government than most people.
1. agree strongly
2. agree
3. neutral
4. disagree
5. disagree strongly
22. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can’t
really understand what’s going on.
1. agree strongly
2. agree
3. neutral
4. disagree
5. disagree strongly
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GeneralAttitudes About Government and Politics
Please mark only one answer for each question.
23. How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington
to do what is right?
1. always
2. most of the time
3. only some of the time
24. When it comes to taxes, do you think that people in the government waste a lot of
the money, some of the money, or don’t waste very much of the money? Choose
below.
1. they waste a lot of the money.
2. they waste some of the money
3. they don’t waste very much of the money
25. Would you say that the government is pretty much run by a few big interests
looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?
1. It’s run by a few big interests looking out for themselves.
2. It’s run for the benefit of all the people.
26. How many people running the government do you think are crooked?
1. quite a few
2. not very many
3. hardly any of them
27. Do you think that public officials care much what people like you think?
1. yes, they care very much
2. they care some
3. no, they don’t care much
28. Over the years, how much attention do you feel the government pays to what the
people think when it decides what to do?
1. a good deal
2. some
3. not much
29. How much do you feel that having elections makes the government pay attention to
what the people think?
1. a good deal
2. some
3. not much
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30. How much mterest would you say you have in the Office of the Presidency?
Limited Interest________________________________ A Great Deal of Interest
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
31. How much interest would you say you have in Congress?
Limited Interest________________________________ A Great Deal of Interest
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
32. Do you think the president is doing a good job? Mark how you feel about the way
the president is handling his job.
1. approve strongly
2. approve
3. neutral
4. disapprove
5. disapprove strongly
33. Do you think that members of Congress are doing a good job? Mark how you feel
about the way they are handling their jobs.
1. approve strongly
2. approve
3. neutral
4. disapprove
5. disapprove strongly
34. On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means “rarely” and 10 means “frequently”:
• how often would you say you watch local TV news? ____
•

how often would you say you watch network TV news? ____
how often would you say you watch late-night TV entertainment talk shows,
such as “Late N i^ t with David Letterman” and “The Tonight Show”? ____
how often would you say you watch TV political talk shows such as “Larry
King” and “Crossfire”? ____
how often would you say you visit Internet news sources?____

35. How often do you feel that political issues covered on television are relevant for
your age group?
1. very often
2. sometimes
3. rarely
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36. How often do you feel that shows with political content are targeted toward your
age group?
1. very often
2. sometimes
3. rarely
37. Generally, how many hours a day do you spend watching T. V.?
1. one hour or less
2. two or three hours
3. four or more hours
38. Generally, how many hours a day do you spend on the Internet?
1. one hour or less
2. two or three hours
3. four or more hours

The remaining questions arefor demographicpurposes andfor information on voting
behavior.
39. How old are you?
1. 18 to 21
2. 22 to 29
3. 30 to 39
4. 40-49
5. 50-59
6. 60 or older
40. Were you old enough to vote in the last presidential election?
1. no
2. yes
41. Did you vote in the last presidential election?
1. no
2. yes
42. If yes, who did you vote for?
1. Clinton
2. Perot
3. Dole
4. Other__________________ (Please specify)
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43. Do you plan to vote in the next presidential election?
1. no
2. maybe
3. yes
44. If yes, who do you plan to vote for?
1. Gore
2. Bush
3. Other__________________(Please specify)
45. What is your sex?
1. male
2. female
46. Do you have children?
1. no
2. yes
47. Are you married?
1. no
2. yes
48. What is your race?
1. White (non-Latino)
2. African American
3. Asian American/Pacific Islander
4. Latino/Mexican American
6. Native American
7. Other____________________ (Please specify)
THANK YOU FORTAKING THE TIME TO BE A PART OF THIS SURVEY!
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TABLE 1
Pearson Correlations Between Television and Political Engagement Variables

TVHrs.

Loc. News

Netwk. News

Ent. Tk.

Pol. Tk.

Efficacy

.152

-231*

-.317*

.121

-.414**

Int. in Pol.

.050

-.189*

-223*

-.035

-.327**

Int. in Pres.

.057

234*

312**

.041

220*

Int. in Cong.

.002

229*

289**

-.114

305**

Involvmnt.

.052

-.319**

-380**

.080

-.435**

Assessment o f Pres.

-200

-.088

-.166

-.026

-.191*

Assessment o f Cong.

.III

.015

-.090

-.025

.101

Cynicism Re: Pol.

.072

.157

.139

-210*

.165

Trust Re: Pol.

.082

-.III

.038

230*

-.033

Trust Gov't in Wash.

.055

254**

.003

-.052

.018

Are Taxes Wasted

.058

.093

.093

.059

-.030

Who Runs G ov't

.016

-.079

.091

.073

-.167

G o v 't Crooked

-.089

.017

.181

.140

.094

*p<.05,**p<.01
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